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INTRODUCTION

The election of Barack Obama and the coming of a new
administration in the White House are certain to mean a number
of changes in the United States’ approach to fighting terrorism and
maintaining national security. Among the changes that have been
at the top of many lists are the closing down of the detention
facility at Guantánamo Bay, the repeal of the Military Commissions
Act (MCA), and the cessation of prosecutions by military
1
The detention, treatment, and prosecution of
commission.
captured enemy combatants by the Bush administration have been
† Associate Professor of Law, New England Law, in Boston, Massachusetts.
Thanks to my research assistant, Jillian Cavanaugh, for her excellent support.
1. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec.
Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing_room/executive_orders/.
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singled out for criticism as the worst aspects of that administration’s
2
program to fight terrorism. In addition, the Bush administration
has suffered a string of defeats in cases brought before the United
States Supreme Court challenging various aspects of the military
3
commissions.
The criticisms of and the legal challenges to the military
commissions fell along a broad spectrum, from arguments that the
President lacked the authority to unilaterally create a military
commissions system, to attacks on specific aspects of the military
4
commissions system. Interestingly, some of the most pointed—
and ultimately most effective—challenges to the Bush
5
administration’s program centered on various evidentiary issues.
The initial military commissions program created controversial
6
rules for the use of secret and protected evidence. These initial
rules allowed for certain protected evidence to be used against a
defendant even though the defendant and his civilian attorney
could be denied access to this evidence at all stages of the
7
proceeding. This rule was criticized not only by commentators
8
and academics, but by many military lawyers, including the top
lawyers of each military branch, as a violation of the basic
protections afforded by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
9
Conventions of 1949. In United States v. Hamdan, the Supreme
Court struck down President Bush’s initial military commissions

2. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Article II: The Uses and Abuses of Executive Power, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 187 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4. See Tim Golden, Threats and Responses: Tough Justice: After Terror, a Secret
Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at A11.
5. See Eun Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the
Evidentiary Rules of Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 42 HARV. C.RC.L. L. REV. 139, 189 (2007).
6. See Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1973
(2005).
7. See id. at 1972; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 614.
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & VICTOR HANSEN, THE CASE FOR CONGRESS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2009).
9. See Memoranda from Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate Gen., to Senator
Lindsey Graham (July 25, 2005) (on file with author); see also Jane Mayer, The
Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted,
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV,
Legal Advisor to the Dep’t of State, to Counsel to the President, Comments on Your
Paper on the Geneva Conventions (Feb. 2, 2002) (on file with author).
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order. The Court held that the rules regarding secret evidence
were unauthorized departures from the uniformity requirements
between the rules and procedures for courts-martial and military
11
commissions.
Another evidentiary criticism of Guantánamo and the military
commissions system was that confessions and derivative evidence
obtained by torture and coercion could possibly be used in military
12
Even after the Supreme Court struck down the
commissions.
Bush administration’s system for military commissions in Hamdan,
evidence obtained by coercion has nonetheless remained a part of
the military commissions procedure under the Military
13
Commissions Act.
Still another criticism of detainee treatment at Guantánamo
focused on the unlawful-enemy-combatant-status determination.
Under the procedures established by the military, a Combat Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) made the initial factual determination as
14
to whether a detainee was in fact an unlawful enemy combatant.
An Administrative Review Board would then make annual
reassessments to determine whether the detainee remained a
15
continuing threat. The procedures, and particularly the evidence
needed for the government to meet its burden for continued
detention, have been criticized as lacking any semblance of fair
16
process. The procedures were also created in such a way that it
was very difficult for a detainee to introduce evidence to challenge
10. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634.
11. Id. at 624–25.
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Jen Nessel, Ctr. For Constitutional Rights, CRR
Challenges Validity of Military Commissions and Use of Torture Evidence in New
Death Penalty Case (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
newsroom/press-releases/ccr-challenges-validity-military-comissions-and-usetorture-evidence-new-dea.
13. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 948r, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006)
[hereinafter MCA].
14. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. on the Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 3 (Jul. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
15. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. on Revised Implementation
of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 6 (Jul. 14, 2006), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf.
16. See, e.g., ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, TASK FORCE ON
TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS (Feb. 10, 2003), available at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abarpt21003cmbtnts.
pdf.
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17

the factual basis for his detention. The Supreme Court recently
ruled that the CSRT process was not an adequate substitute for
18
habeas corpus.
Even ardent supporters of this most recent use of military
commissions to try enemy combatants must concede that the
commissions were a failure. In the seven years since the first plan
for the commissions was announced, only a few suspects have been
19
prosecuted, and the outcome of these prosecutions hardly seems
to justify the government’s enormous effort and expense. The
results in individual cases have proven to be much less than the
government had asked for, and the Supreme Court has reviewed
the legality of the commissions system on four occasions and found
20
its structure wanting in every case.
At this writing, President Obama has signed an executive order
directing that the Guantánamo Bay detention facility be closed
21
The President also ordered that a study be
within one year.
conducted to examine the best way to detain and try terrorist
suspects in a manner consistent with American national security
22
and foreign policy interests and the interests of justice. As with
any project this complex, there may not be an easy way to detain
and try these terrorist suspects in any forum, and there is little
doubt that the devil will be in the details.
Regardless of what ultimately happens to these suspects and
irrespective of the fact that the dismantling of Guantánamo may
close a sad chapter in the United States’ fight against terrorism, the
book on many of these very thorny evidence issues remains open.
This will likely not be the last occasion the United States
government and the military will choose to prosecute suspected war
criminals under a military commissions paradigm.
Military
commissions have been a part of American legal history since the
beginning of the Republic and have played a role in most major
17. See Memorandum from Sec’y of the Navy on Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, § G (Jul. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
18. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008).
19. See David J.R. Frakt, An Indelicate Imbalance: A Critical Comparison of the
Rules and Procedures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L.
315, 317–20 (2007).
20. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577 (2006);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
21. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
22. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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conflicts, including the Revolutionary War, Civil War, and World
23
War II. In addition, even with the closing of Guantánamo, there
will be a number of terrorist suspects who will face trial in some
forum. If this forum and any future commissions are to enjoy
legitimacy, we must learn from the failures of this most recent
attempt to use military commissions.
II. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
There are a host of issues that one could explore in search of
lessons to learn from these recent military commissions. But this
article will focus on the evidence rules that were initially developed
for the military commissions, as well as the evidence rules that were
ultimately adopted. From this focus, hopefully, one can better
understand why the Bush administration and, ultimately, Congress
settled on the rules that they did. Focusing on the evidence rules
may also be instructive as politicians and policymakers consider
what to do with the remaining terrorist suspects at Guantánamo.
The abandonment of the rules of evidence, which form the
backbone of any military court-martial or criminal prosecution in
federal court, remains one of the most striking aspects of the Bush
24
administration’s military commissions plan. The very first order
implementing the military commissions rejected this structure;
instead, it implemented a general relevancy standard for the
admissibility of all types of evidence. The rules of evidence stated
simply that:
Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the
Presiding Officer (or instead, if any other member of the
Commission so requests at the time the Presiding Officer
renders that opinion, the opinion of the Commission
rendered at that time by a majority of the Commission),
the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable
25
person.
23. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Long History Behind Military Commissions, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25489.
24. The Military Rules of Evidence model the Federal Rules of Evidence in
most aspects. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (noting similarities
between the Military Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence in the
rules for hearsay, character evidence, impeachment of witnesses, expert testimony,
and authentication).
25. DEP’T OF DEF. MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1, PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY
MILITARY COMM’NS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST
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The Bush administration maintained this approach in later
26
modifications to the military commissions order, and, even under
the Military Commissions Act, the rules of evidence followed this
more open and loose relevance standard by crafting evidentiary
rules that state:
(A) Evidence shall be admissible if the military judge
determines that the evidence would have probative value
to a reasonable person.
...
(C) A statement of the accused that is otherwise
admissible shall not be excluded from trial by military
commission on grounds of alleged coercion or
compulsory self-incrimination so long as the evidence
complies with the provisions of section 948r of this title.
(D) Evidence shall be admitted as authentic so long as—
(i) the military judge of the military commission
determines that there is sufficient basis to find that
the evidence is what it is claimed to be; and
(ii) the military judge instructs the members that they
may consider any issue as to authentication or
identification of evidence in determining the weight,
if any, to be given to the evidence.
(E) (i) Except as provided in clause (ii), hearsay evidence
not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence
applicable in trial by general courts-martial may be
admitted in a trial by military commission if the
proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse
party, sufficiently in advance to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the intention
of the proponent to offer the evidence, and the
particulars of the evidence (including information on the
general circumstances under which the evidence was
obtained). The disclosure of evidence under the
preceding sentence is subject to the requirements and
limitations applicable to the disclosure of classified
information in section 949j(c) of this title.
(ii) Hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under
TERRORISM 9 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter ORDER NO. 1].
26. DEP’T OF DEF. MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1, PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY
MILITARY COMM’NS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf [hereinafter REVISED ORDER NO. 1].
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the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general
courts-martial shall not be admitted in a trial by
military commission if the party opposing the
admission of the evidence demonstrates that the
evidence is unreliable or lacking in probative value.
(F) The military judge shall exclude any evidence the
probative value of which is substantially outweighed—
(i) by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the commission; or
(ii) by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
27
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The magnitude of the initial military commissions approach to
evidence was quite staggering in its scope. Gone were the hearsay
rule and its recognized exceptions, the privilege rules, the
prohibitions against character evidence, the requirements for
authentication, the preferences for the defendant to have the
opportunity to confront his accusers, and a host of other rules
28
In their
found in the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence.
place, the military judge was instructed that the fact finders can
consider any evidence that a reasonable person would consider to
29
have probative value. As any new evidence student quickly learns,
this standard is an extremely low one that greatly favors
admissibility. Why was the government so quick to abandon these
established rules of evidence?
One possibility is that many, if not most, of the rules governing
military commissions were designed by the government for the
primary purpose of making cases easier to prove, and that, without
relaxing the rules, the government’s ability to obtain convictions
would be severely weakened. Boiling down the rules of evidence to
a case-by-case relevancy analysis makes the government’s job of
satisfying its burden of proof much easier.
But this reason alone does not fully answer the question. After
all, the defendant could also benefit from this new relaxed
27. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 949a (2006).
28. It should be noted that the Manual for Military Commissions, which was
created to implement the provisions of the MCA, restored several evidence rules
in a manner consistent with the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence.
Nonetheless, even under the Manual, hearsay evidence remains presumptively
permissible, and the specific exception categories under the Federal and Military
Rules of Evidence were replaced with a rule favoring broad admissibility. Likewise,
the rules of authentication are significantly relaxed when compared to the federal
or military rules. See infra notes 120–28 and accompanying text.
29. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A).
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standard. Nothing in the language of the commission rules
suggests that an accused is held to a different standard. The
defendant does have limited access to the compulsory process of
the military commissions and may have more difficulty obtaining
30
But even so, that does not necessarily
evidence to begin with.
mean that these reduced evidence rules would only favor the
government. A defendant who is unable to call a live witness may
be able to admit a statement from that witness on his behalf, even
though the statement is pure hearsay and does not fall under any
31
recognized exception.
So the question remains, why abandon the rules of evidence in
the military commissions? One possible explanation could be that
abandoning the rules is a tacit admission that the rules of evidence
simply do not work, or at least do not work well. It may also be that
the rules of evidence function well in the tidy courtrooms of a
federal court or a peace time court-martial, but combat may impose
a new level of complexity on the criminal process. Maybe the
formal rules of evidence simply are not suited for combat. Or it
may be that the rules of evidence do not accurately reflect our core
values and fundamental notions of fairness. After all, many of the
traditional evidence rules are a codification of an arcane commonlaw system that may be detached from twenty-first-century realities.
The military commissions give us an opportunity to explore
some of these questions and to reflect on whether the procedures
to try alleged foreign terrorists, or the procedures in future military
commissions, should follow this same approach. Looking back on
the evidentiary scheme of the military commissions also provides an
opportunity to reflect on the application of the rules of evidence in
military courts-martial and other criminal prosecutions.
This article will first discuss the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and the Military Rules of Evidence and explain why
these provisions were created and how they were to be applied
32
within the full spectrum of military operations. The article will
then compare the Military Rules of Evidence to the various
evidentiary rules in the military commissions to illustrate why the
30. See 10 U.S.C. § 949j (granting defendants the right to compel the
production of witnesses and evidence, but restricting that right if classified
information is sought).
31. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (allowing the admission of hearsay
evidence after that evidence is first disclosed to the opposing party).
32. See infra Part III.
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President ultimately settled on the approach reflected in the
33
Are these reasons credible,
Manual for Military Commissions.
and were there other, perhaps unstated, reasons for the rule
34
changes? Does our understanding of the change in evidentiary
rules indicate that similar rationales can be applied to other
35
criminal trials in the military context?
This article also seeks to determine if we are at an evidence
crossroad. Are we at a point where we need to reexamine the way
evidence is treated in military criminal cases tried under the
36
Should certain combat exceptions be written into the
UCMJ?
37
Military Rules of Evidence? Or are recent efforts to depart from
the established rules of evidence in military commissions nothing
more than an attempt to give the government an advantage over a
class of defendants who it deems is not worthy of enjoying the full
38
protections of a fair trial?
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UCMJ AND MILITARY RULES OF
EVIDENCE
A. The UCMJ
The conclusion of World War II saw a groundswell of support
39
for reforms to the military justice system. During the war, many in
uniform were subjected to what they believed was an unfair and
40
arbitrary system of justice. In response, Congress held extensive
hearings and ultimately drafted the UCMJ, which was signed into
41
law by President Harry S. Truman in 1950. The UCMJ was seen as
a compromise between proponents of individual rights and those
who wanted to retain the commander as a source of virtually
42
unlimited control over military justice. Since the enactment of
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Parts IV–V.
36. See infra Part VI.
37. See infra Part V.B.
38. See infra Part V.A.
39. See James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in
the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 187–88 (2002).
40. Id.
41. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950).
42. Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military
Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 629, 637 (1994).
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the code in 1951, there have been two significant amendments, one
43
44
in 1968 and one in 1983.
The 1951 UCMJ and its subsequent amendments provided
individual soldiers with greater rights and protections than they
previously possessed. Some of the significant systemic changes
included the establishment of the Military Service Courts of
45
46
Review, the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and,
47
In
ultimately, review by the United States Supreme Court.
particular, review by the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces was designed to be a check on the commander’s operation
of the military justice system. Other significant systemic reforms
included the creation of the position of the military trial judge and
the creation of the trial judiciary to appoint judges to individual
48
courts-martial. Under Article 37 of the UCMJ, safeguards were
created to prevent those participating in the court-martial,
including the military judge, the attorneys, and the members, from
suffering adverse personnel actions based on their participation in
49
the court-martial. A number of other protections were put into
place to prevent the risk of the commander attempting to
50
unlawfully influence the court-martial process.
A clear policy preference which emerged from the UCMJ’s
43. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as
amended in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950).
44. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (codified as
amended in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950).
45. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2006) (establishing
that a review by this court is automatic for any sentence that includes a punitive
discharge or a sentence to confinement of one year or more).
46. Id. § 867.
47. Id. § 867(a).
48. Id. § 826.
49. Id. § 837 (stating that the precautions were put in place to ensure the
quality of judgments).
50. Id. § 834 (requiring the convening authority to obtain advice from a staff
judge advocate (legal advisor to the commander) before any charge is referred to
a general court-martial); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES,
R.C.M. 306(a) (2008), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/
mcm2008.pdf (requiring that each commander exercise his or her own
independent judgment as to the proper disposition of the case without influence
from a superior authority). In spite of these protections, unlawful command
influence continues to plague the military justice system. Many of the reported
cases by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and its predecessor, the Court
of Military Appeals, have dealt with this issue. It is beyond the scope of this article
to explore these issues in detail. Suffice it to say that as appellate courts have
recognized, unlawful influence is the “mortal enemy of military justice.” United
States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).
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creation is that service members do not give up all of their
individual rights when joining the military. For the military to
maintain a disciplined, effective, and loyal force, a balance between
individual rights and the needs of the military organization was
sought. In attempting to reach that balance, the military turned to
the civilian court system and adopted a number of its provisions.
With the codification of the UCMJ came the creation of the
51
Manual for Courts-Martial. The manual was promulgated by the
President under the authority of Article 36 of the UCMJ, which
delegates to the President the authority to prescribe the rules and
regulations governing trials by courts-martial and trials by military
52
commission. As further proof that Congress looked to the civilian
courts for guidance on how to strike a fair balance, Article 36
directs the President, as far as he deems practicable, to apply the
principles of law and rules of evidence that are generally
recognized in criminal cases in the United States district courts to
53
trials by courts-martial and military commission. This provision
has particular relevance to the development of the Military Rules of
Evidence.
From the time that the UCMJ was passed in 1951 until the
Military Rules of Evidence were implemented in 1980, the rules of
evidence in military courts-martial generally followed developments
in the common law of evidence. Many of these common law rules
and principles were codified, or at least commented on, in the
54
accompanying Manual for Courts-Martial.
B. The Military Rules of Evidence
In 1975, President Ford signed legislation implementing the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Because Article 36(a) of the UCMJ
required the military’s evidence rules to follow any federal rules as
55
far as practicable, efforts began to codify the Military Rules of
Evidence after the creation of the federal rules. These efforts
culminated in March 1980 when President Carter issued an
51. President Truman issued the first Manual for Courts-Martial in 1951.
Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1949–1953). See MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL (2008), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM2008.pdf, for the current version.
52. 10 U.S.C. § 836.
53. Id.
54. Fredric Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Implementation,
130 MIL. L. REV. 5, 7 (1990).
55. 10 U.S.C. § 836.
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executive order amending the Manual for Courts-Martial and
56
promulgating the Military Rules of Evidence. The rules became
57
effective on September 1, 1980.
The philosophy that guided the military rules’ drafters was that
military evidence law should be as consistent with civilian law as
58
This philosophy is best reflected in Military Rule of
possible.
Evidence 1102, which states that “[a]mendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence shall apply to the Military Rules of Evidence
[eighteen] months after the effective date of such amendments
59
unless the President takes action to the contrary.”
The
presumption is that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be
equally applicable in the military context.
Contrary to what one might expect, when the Military Rules of
Evidence were drafted, they did not contain any military or combat
exceptions. For example, the hearsay exceptions under the
Military Rules of Evidence read much like the federal rules with
60
This is equally true with expert
only a few minor changes.
61
62
63
testimony, the character rules, the rules of impeachment, and
64
the authentication rules. One would think that, if there were any
area where a combat or military contingency exception might have
been written into the rules, it would be the rules admitting hearsay
evidence and, perhaps, the rules setting out the authentication
requirements. A loosening of the rules, at least in the context of
ongoing military operations, would arguably reduce the adverse
impact that a court-martial might have on these operations.
Nevertheless, the Military Rules of Evidence did not adopt such an
approach. Instead, the rules established that it is not impracticable
for the military to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, regardless
of the context.
Not only did the drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence
choose to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, but in the area of
56. Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (Mar. 12, 1980).
57. Id. at pt. C.
58. Lederer, supra note 54, at 13.
59. MIL. R. EVID. 1102.
60. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) (business records and public records
hearsay exceptions), with MIL. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) (creating a broader list of
business records and public records hearsay exceptions to include a number of
uniquely military documents).
61. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 702 with FED. R. EVID. 702.
62. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608 with FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608.
63. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 609 with FED. R. EVID. 609.
64. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 901–02 with FED. R. EVID. 901–02.
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privileges the Military Rules of Evidence went a step further.
Rather than adopting the federal rules’ approach, which was not to
codify the privilege rules and instead allow the rules to develop by
65
common law, the Military Rules of Evidence specifically codified a
66
number of privileges, including, for example, a spousal privilege,
67
and a classified information
an attorney-client privilege,
68
privilege.
Since the implementation of the Military Rules of Evidence,
military courts, like their federal counterparts, have proven adept
at interpreting and applying the rules. One of the best examples of
this ability is in the area of expert testimony. A question that vexed
the federal courts after the passage of the Federal Rules of
69
Evidence was the extent to which the Frye test for determining the
reliability of expert testimony had been replaced by Federal Rule
70
702. Years before the Supreme Court announced its holding in
71
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, the military courts grappled with this
question and held that Military Rule of Evidence 702 had replaced
72
Frye as the standard for admissibility of expert testimony.
In the years following the adoption of the Military Rules of
Evidence, the military legal system embraced these rules and
developed a rich and sophisticated body of case law interpreting
and applying the rules in the military context. Over this time, the
Military Rules of Evidence have provided a workable balance
between the rights of the individual and the needs of the military,
and there has not been any significant movement within the
military legal establishment to repeal or substantially modify them.
There are, however, some interesting caveats.
First, since the codification of the Military Rules of Evidence in

65. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
66. MIL. R. EVID. 504.
67. MIL. R. EVID. 502.
68. MIL. R. EVID. 505.
69. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific
evidence “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs” to be admissible at trial).
70. FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing standards for the admission of expert
testimony).
71. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that “general acceptance” is not a necessary
precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence and that a trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring that an expert’s
testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand).
72. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1987) (permitting the result
of a polygraph examination as evidence regarding statements of truthfulness).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 4

2009]

MILITARY COMMISSION EVIDENCE RULES

1493

1980 until the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2001, the
United States military had not been in a protracted war. From
1980–2001, while the military was frequently engaged in a number
of military operations running the spectrum from peacekeeping to
active combat, the events themselves were of relatively short
duration. Those operations that lasted for longer periods of time
have generally been peacekeeping operations. This could mean
that up to the time of the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Military Rules of Evidence were not really tested in the
crucible of combat.
A development that has taken place over the past several years
may also suggest that the UCMJ, in general, is less functional in a
combat environment than intended. Much is made of the need for
the commander to maintain control of the forces under his
command to ensure a disciplined fighting force. It is a wellaccepted axiom that a commander conducting combat operations
needs to have control over the military justice system so that system
can be used as a means of enforcing and maintaining discipline
73
In reality, however, the practice is often quite
over his forces.
different.
There are many situations where the combat
commander has in fact given up control of cases to another military
74
authority outside the theater of combat. The practice of moving
service members out of the theater of combat during a criminal
investigation and subsequent court-martial is quite common. The
reason for this practice is understandable. A commander engaged
in combat operations may not want to be distracted with a criminal
investigation and subsequent trial, particularly in serious cases
which may demand a great deal of time, attention, and resources.
73. Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps?,
28. SW. U. L. REV. 481, 534–41 (1999).
74. Some recent examples of this practice include the Akbar case, the Haditha
prosecutions, and the Abu Ghraib prosecutions. In the Akbar case, a solider
charged with the murder and attempted murder of a number of his comrades on
the eve of the invasion of Iraq was immediately sent back to the United States for
trial within days of the incident. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Trial Opens for Sergeant
Accused of Killing 2 Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A15. The marines charged
with the killings in Haditha have not been tried in the war theater but back at
their home base in San Diego. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Struggle for Iraq:
Investigation: Iraqis’ Accounts Link Marines to the Mass Killing of Civilians, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2006, at A1. The soldiers charged with detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib
prison were all removed from Iraq and were eventually tried in Fort Hood, Texas
and other instillations in the United States. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, The Conflict in
Iraq: Abu Ghraib Scandal: Ringleader in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Is Sentenced to 10 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 112.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/4

14

Hansen: The Usefulness of a Negative Example: What We Can Learn about Evi

1494

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4

Instead, the commander may elect to keep those resources focused
on combat operations, allowing a commander out of the theater to
determine the disposition of the case.
A second development over the past several years is that a
great many offenses, particularly minor offenses that were
previously prosecuted by a court-martial, are now resolved by other
administrative means. These methods are referred to as nonjudicial punishment and administrative actions, and these forums
75
do not require the formal application of evidentiary rules. This
suggests that, for a large number of minor offenses, the military
justice system operates outside of the formal rules of evidence.
Even with these two caveats in mind, it can be said of the
Military Rules of Evidence that since their adoption in 1980, the
military legal culture has embraced them and, like their federal
counterpart, these rules form the backbone of every criminal case
tried in courts-martial. When we look at the evidentiary rules put
in place for the trial of enemy combatants under military
commissions, we see a very different approach. Given the military’s
familiarity, competence, and experience with the Military Rules of
Evidence, the President certainly could have simply transposed
them over to the military commissions. He did not do that.
IV. MILITARY COMMISSIONS APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
As noted above, the President’s initial order establishing the
military commissions in March 2002 set out a general relevance
76
standard as the only rule of evidence for the military commissions.
This standard did not require the presiding officer to conduct any
balancing between admissibility and unfair prejudice, and
relevance of the evidence would not be offset by other concerns.
As long as the evidence had “probative value to a reasonable
77
person,” it was admissible. In addition, if the presiding officer
were to conclude that the evidence did not have probative value to
a reasonable person, that decision could be overturned by a
75. In 2006, the Army imposed nonjudicial punishment in 42,814 cases for a
rate of 74.53 per thousand service members; the Navy and Marine Corps imposed
nonjudicial punishment in 26,080 cases for a rate of 4.9 per thousand service
members; and the Air Force imposed nonjudicial punishment in 7,616 cases for a
rate of 21.78 per thousand service members. See Annual Report Submitted to the
Committees on Armed Services, CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUST., apps. 3–5 (2006),
available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY06Annual Report.pdf.
76. ORDER NO. 1, supra note 25, at 9.
77. Id.
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majority of the commission, and the evidence would be
78
considered.
The first modification to the commissions’ process came in
79
August 2005. This order rescinded the initial commissions order
and set out a new and somewhat different process for the trial of
enemy combatants in military commissions. With respect to the
evidence procedures, some minor modifications were made on how
protected evidence would be treated. Otherwise, it left the general
80
relevancy rule from the first order in place. It was this order that
the Supreme Court reviewed and ultimately struck down in
81
Hamdan.
In Hamdan, the Court noted that Article 36 of the UCMJ does
not absolutely prevent military commissions from establishing
procedures different from those in Article III courts, courts-martial,
82
or other military tribunals. For those differences to comply with
83
Article 36, however, certain conditions must be met. First, the
President must determine that it would be impracticable to apply
84
the procedures of federal district courts to military commissions.
The Court found that the President had made that determination,
85
and the Court gave him complete deference as to that decision.
Second, according to the Court, Article 36 requires another
determination before military commissions procedures could
86
depart from those used in courts-martial. Under Article 36(b),
the President must determine that it is impracticable for military
87
commissions and courts-martial to have uniform procedures. The
historical reasons for the uniformity of procedures between military
88
The difference
commissions and courts-martial are twofold.
between military commissions and courts-martial was originally
jurisdiction alone, and such a difference would not justify a
89
More
separate set of procedural rules for each forum.
importantly, uniformity was required to “protect against abuse and
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Revised Order No. 1, supra note 26, at 11–12.
Id. at 10.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006).
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 623.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 617.
Id.
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ensure evenhandedness under the pressures of war.” The Court
held that there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that it
would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules to military
91
commissions. The Court further concluded that the absence of
any showing why the rules for courts-martial were impracticable was
particularly disturbing in light of the clear and admitted failure to
apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded by the
Manual for Courts-Martial and the UCMJ—the right of the accused
92
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the military
to be present.
93
commissions procedures violated Article 36 of the UCMJ. The
military commissions were invalid because the President and
Congress had not determined that it was impracticable to follow
court-martial rules and procedures, including the Military Rules of
Evidence.
Following the Hamdan decision, Congress and the President
acted quickly to create a military commissions system that reflected
their collective determination as to which court-martial rules and
94
procedures would be impracticable in the commissions’ context.
Out of this process came the evidentiary rules found in Section
95
For the most part, the evidence rules
949a(b) of the MCA.
contained in the MCA are similar to the earlier commissions’ rules.
The MCA rules continue to use general relevancy as the standard
and, in addition, specifically articulate how to apply the general
96
relevance standard with hearsay evidence and authentication.
The one additional feature of the MCA rules is that now the
military judge conducts not only a relevancy analysis similar to
Military Rule of Evidence 401, but also does a legal relevancy
97
analysis very similar to a Rule 403 determination. So while the
MCA rules were more robust then the earlier commissions’ rules,
they were still a far cry from what is contained in the Military Rules
90. Id.
91. Id. at 623.
92. Id. at 624.
93. Id. at 625.
94. See id. at 623–24 (stating that because the president failed to demonstrate
that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in the case at hand,
court-martial rules applied). Hamdan was decided on June 29, 2006. Id. at 557.
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 on October 17, 2006.
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006)).
95. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b).
96. Id. § 949a(b)(2).
97. Id. § 949a(b)(2)(F).
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of Evidence. These MCA rules, however, were not the last word on
the subject.
After the MCA was passed, the Secretary of Defense
98
promulgated the Manual for Military Commissions (MMC). The
MMC was written under the authority of Section 949a(a) of the
MCA to establish a detailed set of rules to govern military
99
commissions trials. To the extent practicable and consistent with
intelligence activities, section 949a(a) requires the Secretary of
Defense to apply the principles of law and rules of evidence for
100
The consequence of this
trials by general courts-martial.
requirement was that the rules of evidence now contained in the
MMC in many respects are a mirror image of the Military Rules of
101
Two key exceptions, however, remain. Hearsay
Evidence.
evidence is still presumptively admissible, and the specific
exception categories under the Federal and Military Rules of
Evidence are replaced by a general rule of admissibility for hearsay
102
The rules of authentication are also significantly
evidence.
103
relaxed when compared to the federal and military rules.
V. RATIONALES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS EVIDENCE RULES
From their initial inception until this final implementation,
the rules of evidence for military commissions have undergone
significant changes. In place of the initial skeleton rules of general
relevance, the commissions ultimately have a set of rules, which,

98. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2007) [hereinafter MMC], available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20FOR%20MILITARY%20COM
MISSIONS%202007%20signed.pdf.
99. 10 U.S.C.§ 949a(a) (2006).
100. Id.
101. Compare, e.g., MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 404 with MIL. R. EVID. 404
(admissibility of character evidence). The Military Commission Rules of Evidence
are located in Part III of the Manual for Military Commissions. MMC, supra note
98, pt. III.
102. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay may be admitted on the
same terms as any other form of evidence except as provided by these rules or by
any Act of Congress applicable in trials by military commissions.”) with MIL. R.
EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by any
Act of Congress applicable in trials by court-martial.”).
103. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 901 (allowing evidence to be admitted as
authentic if military judge so determines and instructs commission members to
consider authenticity of evidence when weighing the evidence) with MIL. R. EVID.
901–02 (requiring proponent of evidence to authenticate it before it can be
admitted).
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104

with two notable and significant exceptions, look quite similar to
the Military and Federal Rules of Evidence. If this is where we have
ended up, why did the President initially order such an extreme
departure from the Military Rules of Evidence, and why did the
final military commissions evidence rules take a different approach
to hearsay and authentication?
Finding a clear, consistent articulation from the Bush
administration as to why it elected to try these enemy combatants
by military commissions rather than courts-martial or in federal
court is not an easy task to begin with, and it becomes even more
difficult to find a clear explanation as to why the Military Rules of
Evidence were initially thought to be unsuitable for military
commissions. In his order on November 13, 2001, President Bush
stated that “[g]iven the danger to the safety of the United States
105
and the nature of international terrorism,” non-citizens would be
106
detained and, when tried, would be tried by military tribunals.
Subsequent statements by administration and Pentagon officials
elaborated on this theme. One administration official stated that
the President’s principal objective in using military commissions
was to “set up a body of rules that will allow us to protect
information to achieve additional intelligence gathering purposes
107
Other officials
that may lead to the capture of more terrorists.”
noted that the commission order “capitalize[s] on the flexibility
needed because of the increased need to protect intelligence
108
information that occurs during an armed conflict.”
Often, however, these statements lacked any specific
articulation defining the necessity of particular rules dealing with
protected information. John Altenburg, selected by the Secretary
of Defense to serve as the Appointing Authority for the military
commissions, articulated the rationale for the military commissions
as follows:
104. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. See generally Choi, supra
note 5, at 157–58.
105. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted
in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006) (notes).
106. See id.
107. News Transcript, Senior Defense Official, Background Briefing on
Military Comm’ns, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Jul. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2797.
108. News Transcript, Senior Defense Official, Background Briefing on the
Release of Military Comm’n Instructions, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (May 2, 2003),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030502-0144.html.
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[T]he government chose for many different reasons to
use a military commission process. It doesn’t mean that
the others were wrong. It just means that the government
chose on balance, given the nature of the allegations that
were being made and I think especially national security
interests, that they chose to use the commission process,
109
thinking that that would meet the balanced needs.
This is hardly a clear and specific explanation of the rationale for
military commissions, and it certainly allows one to question the
administration’s motives.
The explanations are even less clear when we ask more
pointed questions. For example, how does the abandonment of
the hearsay rules, or the character rules, or the impeachment rules,
as was done under the initial commission orders, necessarily
enhance national security or protect classified information? There
does not seem to be any clear answer. If protecting classified
information was not the primary or only motivation for replacing
the evidence rules with one general relevance rule, then perhaps
there are other reasons.
One explanation could be that the military commissions were
intended to be courts of expediency. Quite literally, there was the
possibility that these trials could occur on the battlefield and in the
heat of battle. In such an environment, expediency and the need
to protect our forces and interests against enemy threats may
dictate a form of “rough justice” where all of the procedural
niceties of the rules of evidence do not have a place.
Another possibility is that, even if the trial itself is not
conducted in the heat of battle, those who may be asked to
participate as witnesses and commission members may be engaged
in combat or other important duties related to national defense. It
could be that the more formal rules were replaced with a general
rule of relevancy recognizing that there would be too great of an
impact on national security if one required members of the military
and others to be taken away from their important duties to serve as
witnesses in military commissions.
Unfortunately, the President and Congress were no clearer in
their reasoning behind the evidence rules put forth in the MCA
109. News Transcript, John Altenburg, Appointing Authority for the Office of
Military Commissions, Def. Dep’t Briefing on Military Comm’n Hearings, U.S.
Dep’t of Def. (Aug. 17, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2004/tr20040817-1164.html.
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and the MMC. To claim that the evidence rules contained in the
MMC reflect the President’s and Congress’s thoughtful
determination as to why certain evidentiary rules would be
impractical in the military commissions context is a stretch. When
one looks at the actual rules contained in the MMC, I believe that
there are primarily two possible explanations for the military
commissions’ departure from the Military Rules of Evidence.
Neither of these explanations has been stated by any Bush
administration official, member of Congress, or by anyone within
the Defense Department. Nonetheless, I believe that both of these
explanations serve as the underlying rationale for the military
commissions’ departure from the established Military Rules of
Evidence.
One reason for the different evidence rules for military
commissions was a belief by Bush administration officials that
unlawful enemy combatants tried by military commission simply
did not deserve the protections afforded by the full application of
the Military Rules of Evidence. The other explanation for why the
commissions rules reflected in the MMC expanded the use of
hearsay evidence and rejected more formal authentication
requirements is the belief that the Military Rules of Evidence have
proven to be too cumbersome to apply during a time of war and in
active theaters of combat. The military commissions simply
presented the first opportunity to craft more flexible rules from a
clean slate.
A. The National Security Rationale
The first explanation, that enemy combatants tried by military
commission did not deserve the protections afforded by the full
application of the Military Rules of Evidence, was alluded to in a
number of different ways by the Bush administration. One such
allusion was that, because the legal status of these enemy
combatants is different from other individuals, the protections
afforded them are also different.
Initially, the Bush
administration’s view was that members of Al Qaeda and other
enemy combatants did not enjoy the protections of Common
110
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. While the administration’s
110. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004)
(citing Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Statement by the
Press Sec’y on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003)).
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stated policy was to treat these unlawful enemy combatants
111
the
consistently with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions,
administration would have the exclusive power to decide just how
close to the spirit of Geneva that treatment would fall. The
112
Supreme Court rejected this position in Hamdan. But even if the
Court had upheld the Bush administration’s position and found
the status of these enemy combatants to be legally unique, why
does that different legal status necessarily result in a different and
more relaxed application of the evidentiary rules? At a minimum,
the government should have been required to make some showing
that the difference in legal status would be meaningful in the
context of the determinations the tribunals would have to make on
evidentiary issues. The Bush administration never made that
showing, relying instead upon the simple assertion that a difference
in legal status is meaningful in the context of a tribunal’s
113
determination of a detainee’s connection to terrorist activities.
Another Bush administration contention focused on the
identity of the detainees as alien enemy combatants sworn to
114
The horrific experience of
support the terrorist cause.
September 11th and the possibility that terrorists would strike again
with even more deadly means and methods may have driven the
administration to conclude that these suspects, as the
representatives of Al Qaeda we have in custody, simply did not
deserve the evidentiary protections we afford defendants in
criminal trials and military courts-martial. To afford them the full
protections of the evidence rules, in other words, would be to
dignify these individuals as somehow worthy of treatment above
115
mere contempt.
The problem, of course, is that adjusting the level of
protection afforded these individuals in criminal and quasicriminal contexts, based primarily upon the moral assessment of
111. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President,
et al., Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020207-2.pdf.
112. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006).
113. Id. at 646.
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. As the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis observed, “[w]e of the West
have often failed catastrophically in respect for those who differ from us . . . . But it
is something for which we have striven as an ideal and in which we have achieved
some success, both in practicing it ourselves and in imparting it to others.”
BERNARD LEWIS, CULTURES IN CONFLICT: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN THE AGE
OF DISCOVERY 78 (1995).
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the individual’s alleged actions, reflects a policy long abandoned,
116
As in any case
and rightly so, in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
in which an act condemned by the community has occurred,
neither the community nor its governmental representatives has a
special moral claim with respect to a particular individual until that
person has been determined through fair procedures to be
117
guilty.
The willingness to depart from the rules of evidence in the
military commissions suggests that these rules, which the Bush
administration was so quick to abandon, either do not reflect the
core values of what it means to have a fair trial, or that this category
of suspect does not deserve a fair trial. The rules of evidence, as
reflected in both the federal and military rules, represent the
collective wisdom of hundreds of years of experience, as well as
specific policy choices established to help ensure a fair trial for all
118
parties.
It is fair to say that, at least to a certain extent, these
rules reflect what Anglo-American jurisprudence establishes as
essential components of a fair trial.
If the rules of evidence reflect our values of what it means to
have a fair trial, then their rejection must mean that enemy
combatants tried by military commissions do not deserve a fair trial.
We should reflect very carefully on this rationale. If we adopt a
similar rationale in trying suspected terrorists in future military
commissions, then we would once again start down a very slippery
slope. Suppose the President can significantly limit a defendant’s
fundamental right to a fair trial by abandoning the rules of
evidence in favor of a general relevance standard because of who
the defendant is, the defendant’s alleged crimes, or the difficulty in
obtaining a conviction without abandoning the rules. If the
President is allowed this power, then these same steps may be taken
to limit the protections provided by the rules of evidence to a
service member or a citizen in a future situation where the
President believes a similar justification exists. To believe that
constitutional protections would prevent this from ever occurring
116. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (discussing repudiation
in Anglo-American jurisprudence of the tactics of the Star Chamber and how,
“[u]nder our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the
accused . . . not by interrogation of the accused even under judicial safeguards,
but by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation”).
117. See Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 488–89 &
n.10 (1995) (book review).
118. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
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does not address the issue: constitutional standards, in particular
criminal procedure protections, have almost always been
interpreted to mean different things in different contexts.
We should also understand that the abandonment of these
rules in favor of a general standard of relevancy would not impact
both sides equally in military commissions. First, because the
government has the burden of proof and is responsible for
introducing a sufficient quantum of evidence to obtain a
conviction, it would benefit the most if the rules of admissibility are
reduced to a standard of general relevance.
Because the
prosecution has at its disposal the full investigative resources of the
government, it is also in a better position to develop and admit
evidence whose relevance is minimal at best. This means that more
evidence would be admitted and the fact finder would be able to
make more tenuous inferences suggesting guilt. The defendant,
whose access to compulsory process is limited under the military
commissions, would often be at a disadvantage and unable to
counter the government’s evidence.
Perhaps those who were charged with drafting the rules of
evidence that were ultimately incorporated into the MMC
recognized the dangerous precedent that had been set by earlier
Bush administration efforts. In response, they sought to restore
some of the fundamental aspects of a fair trial by including many of
the previously disregarded rules of evidence in the rules finally
adopted for trial by military commission. Or perhaps after
suffering one defeat by the Supreme Court over evidentiary rules,
the drafters were simply unwilling to risk another defeat.
Whatever the reason for the final form of the MMC’s evidence
rules, they did not restore all of the Military Rules of Evidence.
Notably, the rules regarding hearsay evidence and authentication
119
Considering these modifications
were significantly modified.
carefully, there may be another possible explanation for the
military commissions’ departure from the Military Rules of
Evidence. Perhaps some of the current restrictions in the Military
Rules of Evidence should no longer apply in the military context, at
least when the application of certain rules could disrupt ongoing
combat and other important national-security operations. These
specific modifications to the hearsay and authentication rules at
least suggest this possibility.
119.

See MMC, supra note 98, pt. III, §§ VIII–IX.
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The evidence rules under the MMC create a presumption for
the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The hearsay rules keep the
same definitions for hearsay as set out in Military and Federal Rule
120
The MMC, however, reverses Military Rule of
of Evidence 801.
Evidence 802 by stating that hearsay evidence may be admitted on
121
MMC Rule 803 provides
the same terms as any other evidence.
122
that hearsay evidence may be admissible in one of two ways. First,
the evidence may be admissible on the same terms as it is
123
In other words, it is
admissible in trial by general courts-martial.
admissible under the exceptions now contained in rules 803 and
804. Second, even if the hearsay evidence does not meet a specific
exception, the MMC makes hearsay admissible so long as adequate
124
If the party opposing
notice is provided to the opposing party.
admissibility can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
125
that the hearsay evidence is unreliable, it is not admissible.
This
change makes all forms of hearsay presumptively admissible.
With respect to the rules of authentication, the MMC rules also
reflect a major change. The sections of the Military Rules of
126
are
Evidence governing authentication and identification
127
Rule 901 of the MMC states that
replaced by one simple rule.
“[e]vidence shall be admitted as authentic if the military judge
determines that there is sufficient basis to find that the evidence is
what it is claimed to be,” and if the “judge instructs the
[commission panel] that they can consider any issue [of]
128
authentication in determining the weight to give that evidence.”
That the drafters of the MMC restored many of the Military
Rules of Evidence in the military commissions with the exception of
these two major modifications suggests that they felt that the
traditional hearsay and authentication rules have no place in the
military commissions. It should be noted here, too, that the MMC
does allow for use of classified evidence, and the rules allow the
120. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 801. Compare id. with FED. R. EVID. 801 (hearsay
definition in Federal Rules of Evidence) and MIL.R. EVID. 801 (hearsay definition
in Military Rules of Evidence).
121. MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 802. Compare id. with MIL. R. EVID. 802 (disallowing
admission of hearsay evidence unless rules provide otherwise).
122. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 803(a)–(b).
123. Id. 803(a).
124. Id. 803(b).
125. Id. 803(c).
126. See MIL. R. EVID. 901–03.
127. See MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 901.
128. Id.
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defendant to view and have access to that evidence on terms very
129
similar to Military Rule of Evidence 505. This would suggest that
national security and protecting sensitive evidence are not the
primary motivations behind the major modifications to the hearsay
and authentication rules.
B. The Combat Rationale
If national security is not the primary reason behind the
significant relaxation of the hearsay and authentication rules in
military commissions, and if the drafters of the MMC restored
other evidentiary rules, many of which will help to ensure a
fundamentally fair trial, it seems that these particular rule changes
were made out of a belief that it would be too burdensome to
require first-hand testimony and specific authentication procedures
in military commissions.
As used historically, and perhaps as initially envisioned in this
most recent instance, military commissions often took place on the
battlefield in the midst of ongoing combat operations. In such an
environment, formal requirements of authentication may have
proven to be too burdensome and unnecessary since the fact finder
is free to evaluate the evidence and give it whatever weight he or
she determines is appropriate. Likewise, the rules favoring direct
testimony over hearsay evidence may not work in the heat of battle,
where it is unreasonable and unrealistic to literally pull witnesses
off the battle lines in order to testify, especially when their
testimony can be obtained by less burdensome, if somewhat less
reliable means.
The most recent military commissions, however, did not take
place on the battlefield or even in an active combat zone. They
took place thousands of miles away in the very secure detainee
compound at Guantánamo Bay, far removed from the exigencies of
battle. That is not to say, however, that battlefield considerations
are no longer a factor. In military commissions cases, the evidence
needed to convict a detainee of violations of the MCA would likely
often come from people who are unavailable to testify, either
because they cannot be located or because they are unwilling to
testify. Additionally, those witnesses who may be members of the
military or other government agents and employees may be
129. Compare MIL. COMM’N. R. EVID. 505 (protection of classified information)
with MIL. R. EVID. 505 (protection of classified information).
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working in essential missions, and it would pose a major disruption
if they were required to testify personally at a military commissions
proceeding. Similar disruptions to ongoing operations may also
occur if more formal authentication procedures were required by
the rules of evidence.
In considering the modifications the drafters of the MMC
made to the final rules of evidence applicable to military
commissions, it can be argued that they took a pragmatic approach,
modifying the hearsay and authentication rules so that trials by
military commission could proceed without disrupting other ongoing military operations. In essence, the MMC created a type of
combat exception allowing for greater admissibility of both hearsay
evidence and other evidence that may not meet the current
standards of authentication set out in the Military Rules of
Evidence. Neither the President, nor Congress, nor the drafters of
the MMC stated that the reason for these changes was to create a
combat exception to the rules of evidence. Nevertheless, this
seems to be one practical consequence of the commissions’
evidence rules.
The two-part question, then, is: (1) are these modifications to
the hearsay and authentication rules necessary or desirable; and
(2) should similar rules be adopted in future trials of suspected
terrorists or future military commissions? Intuitively, perhaps these
changes make some sense. The problem is that these changes do
not seem to be based on any solid data or information. In
addition, since the Military Rules of Evidence were adopted in
1980, there has not been any strong movement within the military
legal community or within the larger military community for the
creation of combat exceptions to the rules of evidence. Creating
these combat exceptions to the hearsay and authentication rules
without giving the question more detailed study and analysis may
have a number of unintended consequences.
One such consequence is the impact that such a change might
have on other trials. If the need to create a combat exception to
the Military Rules of Evidence is one possible rationale behind
these final MMC rules, that same rationale for a relaxation of the
hearsay and authentication rules can be made to virtually any courtmartial conducted on the battlefield or to any trial where live
testimony and authentication procedures could disrupt other
important governmental activities. After all, it is not only trials
conducted by military commission which could potentially disrupt
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on-going military operations. In fact, since many courts-martial are
conducted much closer to the battlefield then the military
commissions at Guantánamo Bay, the impact on on-going military
operations by court-martial trials could potentially be even greater
than the impact caused by military commissions.
To date, few military legal experts, academics, or practitioners
have suggested that the hearsay rules and the rules of
authentication contained in the Military Rules of Evidence have
proven to be unworkable in a battlefield environment. The wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan are the first prolonged engagements that the
military has been involved in since the Military Rules of Evidence
were codified. When the dust settles on these wars and there is
time for reflection and evaluation, some may argue for a kind of
combat exception to the military rules along the lines of the
commissions’ rules.
Certainly, the military commissions’
modification of the hearsay and authentication rules establishes a
precedent for changes to the Military Rules of Evidence in the
future. To create such a precedent, however, without more careful
and detailed study than has occurred to date is unwise.
In considering the lessons we can learn from this most recent
round of military commissions, we should be very cautious about
turning to the commissions’ evidence rules as a precedent for
changes to the Military Rules of Evidence. The history of the UCMJ
and the Military Rules of Evidence suggests that these rules and
procedures were intended to be used across the entire spectrum of
military operations because no combat exceptions were included.
This approach reflected the view that the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which served as the basis for the military rules, struck an
appropriate balance between the needs of the military and the
rights of the individual soldier. This determination was the
product of debate and deliberation among the drafters of the
military rules.
By contrast, it is hard to say that the rules of evidence for
military commissions have enjoyed such careful deliberation. As we
have seen, the commissions’ evidence rules began with a basic
relevancy rule in the President’s initial orders. The rules contained
in the MCA reflect that same basic approach and were drafted in
haste after the Supreme Court invalidated the President’s
unilateral military commissions process. When the drafters of the
MMC set out their final version of the rules of evidence for military
commissions, they did not include an explanation or discussion as
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to why the hearsay and authentication rules were so different from
the military and federal rules. Additionally, the promulgation of
these rules for military commissions was not the product of public
debate, and there is nothing to suggest that these changes are a
response to legitimate concerns about the impact that the current
hearsay and authentication rules have on on-going combat
operations. In short, the hearsay and authentication rules now
contained in the MMC should have little, if any, precedential value
to any future consideration of whether there is a need to create a
combat exception to the Military Rules of Evidence. For this same
reason, if suspected terrorists are to be tried in some forum other
then federal district court or military courts-martial, or if the
creation of military commissions is contemplated again in the
future, the evidence rules developed in this most recent military
commissions system should have little precedential value. If a
combat exception to the Military Rules of Evidence is considered,
then the consideration should be based on how effective these
rules proved to be in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and how
disruptive their application was to on-going combat operations. To
date, no study has been undertaken to explore this question.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD
The recent experience with the rules of evidence in military
commissions has given us an opportunity to reflect on whether
procedures to try alleged foreign terrorists, as well as future military
commissions procedures, should adopt rules of evidence consistent
with the federal and military rules or if we should follow a different
approach. Looking back on the evidentiary scheme created for the
most recent military commissions also gives us an opportunity to
reflect on the application of the rules of evidence in military courtsmartial and other criminal prosecutions.
Maybe the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence keep too
much information from the fact finders, and perhaps the fact
finder would reach more accurate and more just results if they had
access to information that is often excluded under formalistic
evidentiary rules. Maybe many of these rules are not a reflection of
our core values and are not necessary for a fair trial. And maybe
the rules have proven to be unworkable in a military or combat
environment. Perhaps the creation of the military commissions
presented the first opportunity for us to start with a clean slate.
Rather than forcing the trial process to be tied to arcane rules,
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perhaps it is better to simply abandon the rules and in their place
adopt a common-sense approach.
Looking at the initial evidence rules proposed by the Bush
administration as well as the rules ultimately settled on for military
commissions, what is most striking is, first, how quickly the
government abandoned well-recognized federal and military rules
and in their place adopted a general rule of relevance. It is also
striking that no explanation or rationale accompanied these
dramatic changes to the rules.
Considering the haste with which these changes were made,
and because there was virtually no explanation accompanying
them, we are left on our own to try and piece together the reasons
for the changes and ask whether they should serve as a useful
precedent for the trial of suspected terrorists, for some future
military commission, or as precedent for broader changes to the
Federal and Military Rules of Evidence. Much can be learned from
this experience, and the most important lesson is what not to do in
the future.
This article argues that the reasons behind the Bush
administration’s efforts at re-writing the rules of evidence for
military commissions were twofold. First, there was the belief that,
to the extent the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence reflect
core components of a fair trial, enemy combatants who were facing
trial by military commission simply did not deserve these
fundamental protections because of their actions. The folly of this
approach can be seen from the fact that the military commissions
process has lacked legitimacy from its inception, and at every turn
the Bush administration’s efforts were frustrated both by the
130
judicial branch and in the court of public opinion. Any efforts to
create a separate tribunal process for the trial of suspected
terrorists and any efforts to create a military commissions system in
the future must not repeat this error. The Obama administration
or some future administration must engage in an honest and clear
examination of the rationale for creating a separate tribunal
process. If the motivation is to deny these suspects the basic
protections of a fair trial because of who they are or what they are
130. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Jackie Northam,
Obama Said Ready to Close Guantanamo, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Jan. 21, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99713003 (stating the
lack of public support for military commissions is one reason why President
Obama is unlikely to retain them).
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suspected of having done, then it is best not to even start down that
road.
This article maintains that the second reason for the changes
to the evidence rules reflected in the MMC was the belief that some
of the evidence rules are simply unworkable in a combat
environment and that some combat or military exceptions to the
rules of evidence should be created. There may be some merit to
this argument.
But here again the efforts of the Bush
administration to create battlefield exceptions to the hearsay and
authentication rules lack legitimacy, because these changes were
not the result of careful study or analysis. Rather, they seemed to
be based on a hunch that these exceptions were needed. Rule
changes of this magnitude, based on hunches and assumptions that
lack thorough and thoughtful consideration, should not enjoy any
precedential value for future military commissions or in proposing
changes to the Military Rules of Evidence.
There is no question that in the efforts to try suspected foreign
terrorists and other enemy combatants, the Bush administration
faced a number of very complex legal issues. As the Obama
administration considers the best approach for the future, the way
ahead is still difficult. With respect to the rules of evidence that
should apply to any future tribunal, there are some lessons from
the past that can help point the way. Any changes to the rules of
evidence used in these proceedings must not be motivated by a
belief that the suspects do not deserve a fair trial; nor should the
rules be based on unsupported assumptions that the current rules
of evidence are unworkable.
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